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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT'S FUTURE 
Welsh S. White* 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA. By Raymond Paternoster. New 
York: Lexington Books. 1991. Pp. xvii, 307. $35. 
The execution of Robert Harris in California on April 21, 1992, 
indicates that the pattern of American executions, which has changed 
dramatically over the past three decades, may be ready to shift again. 
During the mid-1960s, executions, which had occurred at the rate of 
about fifty per year in the late 1950s,I slowed to a trickle and then 
stopped.2 As a result of a series of Supreme Court decisions, culminat-
ing in Furman v. Georgia, 3 which held the then-existing system of cap-
ital punishment unconstitutional, no executions occurred from June 2, 
1967 until January 17, 1977. In the late 1970s, executions resumed 
under a new legal structure,4 but until the mid-1980s few people were 
actually executed.5 Starting in 1984, defendants have been executed at 
the rate of about twenty per year, but these executions have taken 
place primarily in six southern states. 6 Although many defendants in 
large nonsouthern states have been sentenced to death, 7 Harris was 
• Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1962, Harvard; LL.B 
1965, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. 
1. See Department of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics, Capital Punishment 1930-1970, 46 
N.P.S. BULL. Aug. 1971, at 8. 
2. Id. 
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and its companion cases introduced a new era of 
capital punishment. In these cases, the Court held that punishment by death was not automati-
cally unconstitutional, but to impose capital punishment a state had to adopt safeguards to en-
sure the death penalty would be imposed in a just and rational manner. In particular, the Court 
indicated that any capital punishment scheme must include safeguards designed to address two 
concerns: first, reducing the extent to which the death penalty is arbitrarily applied; second, 
providing for individualized sentencing. See generally WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5-6 
(1987). 
5. Between 1977 and 1984, only 11 people were executed. Moreover, four of those 11 have 
been characterized as "voluntaries" because, after being sentenced to death, they did not pursue 
all legal remedies for avoiding execution. See generally Victor L. Streib, Executions Under the 
Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statutes: The Halting Progression from ''Let's Do It" to ''Hey, 
There Ain't No Point in Pulling So Tight," 15 RUTGERS L. J. 443 (1984). 
6. Between the Court's 1976 decisions and December 31, 1992, 188 executions took place. 
Of these, 145, or 77.1%, took place in the states of Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia, 
and Alabama. See DEATH Row, U.S.A., Winter, 1992, at 5 (bulletin published by NAACP 
Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc.). 
7. As of October 31, 1992, for example, California had 341 defendants on death row, Illinois 
147, Ohio 120, and Pennsylvania 143, making a total of751 from these four states alone. DEATH 
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one of the first to be executed after full pursuit of all legal remedies. 8 
Harris' execution foreshadows nationwide application of capital pun-
ishment, which means that substantially more defendants are likely to 
be executed. 
Against this backdrop, Raymond Paternoster's informative book 
on capital punishment is timely and significant.9 Capital Punishment 
in America is not a work of original research, but a consideration of 
some of the most important issues relating to capital punishment. Af-
ter providing an overview of capital punishment in the United States, 
Paternoster considers capital punishment's legal and constitutional is-
sues, the death penalty's operation, and arguments for and against the 
death penalty and concludes with a prediction that capital punishment 
will eventually disappear. Clearly written, with helpful tables and ex-
tensive references, the book is valuable either as a text for students 
who have not yet studied capital punishment or as a source for those 
who want to explore a particular aspect of the subject in greater detail. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Capital Punishment in America aims to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the death penalty in this country and to predict its future. 
The book's success in presenting a clear picture of the various aspects 
of capital punishment is decidedly uneven, however. Not surprisingly, 
given his background as a social scientist, Paternoster stands on surer 
ground when he deals with the empirical or philosophical aspects of 
capital punishment than when he tackles legal or constitutional issues. 
Moreover, the unclear picture that Paternoster's latter discussion pro-
vides of both death penalty litigation and the direction of death pen-
alty jurisprudence constitutes an insecure foundation for his bold 
prediction of capital punishment's demise. 
Paternoster is most effective in analyzing the empirical data relat-
ing to capital punishment's application. Although this material is 
somewhat technical, Paternoster's exposition provides a reasonably 
clear picture of who is being executed. His review of the empirical 
studies indicates that, even in states that have a substantial death row 
population, juries impose the death sentence on convicted murderers 
Row, U.S.A., Fall, 1992, at 11-14, 20-21, 27-29, 30-32 (bulletin published by NAACP Legal 
Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc.). 
8. Others such as Charles Walker of Illinois, who was executed on September 12, 1990, did 
not fully pursue their legal remedies. See id. at 7. 
9. Raymond Paternoster is professor of criminology at the University of Maryland's Institute 
of Criminal Justice and Criminology. His previous articles have examined the death penalty's 
application in particular states, especially South Carolina. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & 
Ann Marie Kazyaka, An Examination of Comparatively Excessive Death Sentences in South Car· 
olina 1979-1987. 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475 (1990); Raymond Paternoster, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: The Case of Victim-Based Racial Dis· 
crimination, 18 LAW & SOCY. REV. 437 (1984). 
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in only about twenty percent of the cases (pp. 168-69). He also main-
tains that, except in cases with the most aggravated circumstances, 10 
no close correlation exists between findings of aggravated circum-
stances and imposition of the death penalty (pp. 165-67). Moreover, 
the data convincingly demonstrate that the victim's race is an impor-
tant variable in capital sentencing. Assuming that all other factors are 
similar, the killer of a white victim in Georgia is more than five times 
as likely to be sentenced to death than the killer of a nonwhite victim 
(p. 134), and, of all possible racial combinations, blacks who kill 
whites are most often sentenced to death (p. 157). These data, but-
tressed by similar findings from other states, provide ample support 
for Paternoster's conclusion that the death penalty continues to be ar-
bitrarily imposed (pp. 182-83). 
Paternoster's consideration of the penological arguments for and 
against the death penalty also provides a valuable picture of certain 
aspects of capital punishment. His analysis of the empirical data relat-
ing to capital punishment's efficacy as a deterrent reinforces the truth 
of Professor Charles Black's statement, made nearly two decades ago: 
"[A]fter all possible inquiry, including the probing of all possible 
methods of inquiry, we do not know, and for systematic and easily 
visible reasons cannot know, what the truth about this 'deterrent' ef-
fect may be."11 In addition, Paternoster's chapter on capital punish-
ment's cost (pp. 187-216), while not comprehensive,12 effectively 
10. The aggravating circumstances used in the empirical studies cited by Paternoster gener-
ally include not only those defined by statute but also those that appear to have been important to 
sentencing juries in the past. Pp. 165-75. This approach, however, has pitfalls. Because aggra-
vating factors are subjective and difficult to quantify, people might reasonably view a particular 
case as extremely aggravated even when relatively few "aggravating circumstances" are present. 
Thus, the researchers' assessment of a particular case's level of aggravation could be subject to 
challenge. 
11. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE 
AND MISTAKE 33 (2d. ed. 1974). In supporting this conclusion, Paternoster provides an excel-
lent summary of recent studies relating to capital punishment's deterrent effect. In particular, he 
discusses Issac Ehrlich's study purporting to show that capital punishment had a substantial 
deterrent effect on the murder rate between 1933 and 1969. Pp. 224-25. Relying on a variety of 
more recent studies, Paternoster incisively criticizes Ehrlich's conclusions, pointing out, for ex-
ample, that the deterrent effect found by Ehrlich disappears when the years 1962 to 1969 are 
removed from his study and that other researchers, using methods similar to Ehrlich's, failed to 
find a similar deterrent effect when they examined homicide rates over slightly different periods. 
P. 226. 
12. In considering the cost and process of a capital trial, Paternoster discusses pretrial costs, 
trial costs, and appeals. Pp. 191-209. Drawing from a variety of articles and empirical studies, 
he suggests that each of these costs is substantially higher in capital cases than in noncapital 
ones. Paternoster fails to point out, however, that this conclusion does not apply when, as is 
often the case, the state provides only meager resources for the defense of indigent capital defend-
ants. See Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Stan-
dard of Care, 68 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript on file with author). 
Moreover, in addressing the question of capital punishment's economic efficacy, Paternoster need 
not have limited his consideration to litigation costs. For example, he could have compared the 
cost of maintaining those sentenced to death as opposed to those sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Because of security considerations, the cost of maintaining a defendant for even a few years on 
death row is considerably higher than the cost of incarcerating a prisoner in the general popula-
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refutes the argument that retaining the death penalty as our harshest 
penalty is economically beneficial. Paternoster also fairly presents and 
then incisively criticizes some of the other leading contemporary argu-
ments in favor of the death penalty (pp. 246-70). Overall, this part of 
Capital Punishment in America lucidly describes the most important 
arguments for and against capital punishment. 
Paternoster's treatment of the legal and constitutional issues sur-
rounding capital punishment is less successful. In his discussion of the 
current legal system, he presents an accurate summary of several of 
the Supreme Court's most important capital punishment decisions but 
fails to place these cases in a framework that intelligibly depicts capital 
punishment's overall legal structure. Following Robert Weisberg's 
classic article relating to the Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence, 13 Paternoster summarizes the Court's decisions in Lockett v. 
Ohio 14 and Zant v. Stephens, 15 but, unlike Weisberg, he does not use 
these cases to draw clear conclusions about either the Court's role in 
regulating capital punishment16 or the nature of capital punishment 
litigation.17 
Consideration of the Court's treatment of ineffective representation 
in capital cases provides a useful prism for examining these issues. Pa-
ternoster details several striking examples of incompetence, including 
a case in which the defendant's attorney, in his argument to the jury, 
referred to his client as "nigger";18 one in which defense counsel had 
not yet read the state death penalty statute at the time of the trial; 19 
and another in which the defense attorney was parking his car when 
the key prosecution witness was testifying.20 After noting that innu-
merable similar examples exist,21 Paternoster reviews and analyzes the 
Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington 22 and concludes that the 
Strickland test does not adequately deal with the problem of attorney 
incompetence in capital cases (p. 89). Because Paternoster fails to pro-
tion for life. See generally Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or 
Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 4S, S6-S7 (1989). 
13. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 30S. 
14. 438 U.S. S86 (1978). 
IS. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
16. See Weisberg, supra note 13, at 39S ("The Supreme Court seems to have decided that It 
no longer wants to use constitutional law to foster legal formulas for regulating moral choice at 
the penalty trial."). 
17. See Id. at 360-83. 
18. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 80S n.13 (11th Cir. 1982). 
19. Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 140S, 141S (4th Cir. 1987). 
20. House v. Balkcom, 72S F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984). 
21. A major study found that horrendous examples of ineffectiveness, similar to those re-
counted by Paternoster, are "legion.'' TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, 
A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF RE-
VIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES SS (Ira P. Robbins rep., 1990). 
22. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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vide an overall context for assessing counsel's role in capital cases, 
however, his brief analysis of Strickland yields no significant insight 
into either the impact of counsel's inadequacies on capital punishment 
litigation or the nature of the legal system's response to the problems 
generated by counsel's frequent inadequacies. In order to provide a 
fuller basis for evaluating Paternoster's prediction of capital punish-
ment's demise, I will briefly address these issues. 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ROLE IN CAPITAL CASES 
A capital trial differs from most criminal trials in that it has two 
phases. If the defendant is convicted of a capital offense in the first 
phase, the case proceeds to a penalty phase at which the sentencer 
(usually the same jury that convicted the defendant) will have to de-
cide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or some 
lesser punishment. At the penalty trial, the prosecutor is permitted to 
introduce evidence relating to statutorily defined aggravating circum-
stances, and the defense is allowed to introduce mitigating evidence 
relating to either the defendant's background or the circumstances of 
the offense. In most jurisdictions, the sentencer then determines 
whether the death penalty should be imposed through a weighing of 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 23 
In many capital cases, the prosecutor will be able to present an 
overwhelming case at the guilt stage. In these cases, defense counsel's 
central mission will be to present an affirmative "case for life" through 
the introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty stage.24 Counsel 
has several objectives in presenting such evidence: to make the jury 
empathize with the defendant;25 to convince the jury that the defend-
ant will not be a future danger if his life is spared;26 and, most impor-
tantly, to make the sentencer understand the reason for the 
defendant's crime. 21 
Presenting mitigating evidence that will achieve these objectives is 
difficult because mitigating evidence is strikingly different from the ev-
23. See Weisberg, supra note 13, at 306. 
24. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 325 (1983). 
25. See Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different, 
42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 703-08 (1991). 
26. Some sentencing statutes specifically provide that the defendant's future danger is a fac-
tor to be taken into account by the sentencer in arriving at its decision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992) ("On conclusion of the presentation of the 
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury: (1) whether there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society .... "); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990). Even 
when the statute does not refer to this factor, experienced defense counsel believe future danger 
will often be important to the sentencer. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 25, at 707. 
27. See WELSH s. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 79-80 (1991). 
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idence presented at most trials. Evidence presented in a typical trial is 
designed to answer questions relating to discrete events, such as 
whether the car went through the red light at the time of the accident 
or whether the defendant had the intent to kill at the time he fired the 
fatal shot. Mitigating evidence, on the other hand, deals with broad 
stretches of history. In order to explain the kind of person the defend-
ant is and the reason for his crime, witnesses may need to testify to the 
defendant's entire life, even including events that occurred before he 
was born.28 To find such evidence, defense counsel must investigate 
every aspect of the defendant's life, exploring all of his significant rela-
tionships and experiences. Moreover, to gain an adequate understand-
ing of the defendant's aberrational behavior, counsel will often need to 
have experts in mental health or related disciplines conduct thorough 
examinations of the defendant.29 To present the mitigating evidence 
effectively, counsel must then review a great mass of material to iden-
tify witnesses and events that will make the defendant's life meaning-
ful to the jury. 
The critical importance of mitigating evidence at the penalty stage 
cannot be overestimated. Although the Supreme Court has held that 
in some circumstances counsel might reasonably decide not to investi-
gate for the purpose of presenting mitigating evidence,30 experienced 
defense attorneys uniformly reject this judgment. At the penalty trial, 
the jury is typically required to weigh aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and to impose the death penalty if the former outweigh 
the latter.31 At the beginning of the penalty trial, the balance usually 
tilts toward aggravation because, having convicted the defendant of a 
capital offense, the jury will generally believe that at least one aggra-
vating circumstance is present. 32 As the jury is inclined toward death 
unless the defense provides a reason to spare the defendant, 33 the fail-
ure to present mitigating evidence constitutes a virtual invitation to 
impose the death penalty. 
Moreover, the effective presentation of mitigating evidence can 
make a difference in almost any capital case. Although Paternoster's 
survey of the empirical evidence shows that the death penalty is im-
posed most frequently in the most aggravated cases, 34 experienced 
28. For example, defense counsel may want to present mitigating evidence establishing that 
the defendant suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome during his mother's pregnancy. See White, 
supra note 12, at 7. 
29. See id., at 30-32. 
30. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
699 (1984). 
31. See Weisberg, supra note 13, at 306. 
32. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306 (1990) (holding that crime for 
which defendant was convicted involved aggravating circumstance of "committ[ing] a killing 
while in the perpetration of a robbery"). 
33. See Lyon, supra note 25, at 696. 
34. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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capital defense attorneys can cite cases in which the introduction of 
persuasive mitigating evidence trumped even overwhelming evidence 
of aggravation. 35 Although the nature and extent of the prosecutor's 
aggravating evidence is undoubtedly significant, capital defense attor-
neys assert that evidence establishing the defendant's humanity and 
explaining the nature of his problem will be even more critical. By 
explaining the defendant's life, including the reason for his crime, de-
fense counsel will often be able to establish a bond between the defend-
ant and the jury, with the result that the jury will not be willing to 
impose a death sentence. 36 
Among a capital defense attorney's many other responsibilities, 
one of the most critical is to preserve the capital defendant's legal 
rights so that, in the event of a death sentence, they can be asserted on 
appeal. As Paternoster indicates, the Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence has turned capital punishment litigation into a veritable 
minefield of legal issues (p. 85). In order to represent a capital defend-
ant effectively, a defense attorney must not only be familiar with the 
specific legal issues governing the defendant's case but also have 
enough knowledge of death penalty jurisprudence to raise any state 
law or federal constitutional issues likely to be of consequence in the 
proceedings against the defendant. 
Ill. THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S REsPONSE TO PROBLEMS GENERATED 
BY INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES 
As Paternoster indicates, inadequate representation in capital cases 
is a widespread problem. 37 Moreover, in many capital cases appar-
ently zealous defense attorneys - either due to oversight or, perhaps, 
as a result of circumstances beyond their control - fail to present 
critical evidence. In Robert Harris' case, 38 for example, defense coun-
sel presented extensive mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's 
background but neglected to present evidence that the defendant had 
organic brain damage. 39 In other cases, counsel's limited resources 
preclude the extensive investigation needed to uncover critical mitigat-
35. See White, supra note 12, at 66. 
36. Id., at 59·60. 
37. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying teitt. 
38. See Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1990). 
39. Harris was examined by two defense psychiatrists appointed by the trial court pursuant 
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). These psychiatrists 
apparently found no evidence that Harris was brain damaged and did not testify at his penalty 
trial. Relying upon testimony by other psychiatrists that he was severely brain damaged, Harris 
subsequently claimed that he was denied effective psychiatric assistance at his penalty trial. The 
Ninth Circuit denied Harris a hearing on this issue, ruling that the right to psychiatric assistance 
established in Ake does not encompass the right to effective psychiatric assistance. 943 F.2d at 
956. 
1436 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1429 
ing evidence; in still others, counsel's inadequate knowledge of the law 
results in a failure to preserve significant legal issues for appeal. 
The legal system's response to the problems generated by such defi-
cient representation has generally been disappointing. In Strickland, 
the Court held that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel a de-
fendant must show both that his attorney's representation "fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness" and that the defendant was 
"prejudice[d]" by his attorney's substandard performance.40 The 
Court's application of its test indicated that even in capital cases the 
standard of reasonableness is quite low. The Court held that counsel's 
failure to investigate for the purpose of presenting psychiatric and 
character evidence at the penalty trial was reasonable because, under 
the circumstances, introduction of this mitigating evidence would 
probably have been unhelpful and might have been counter-
productive. 41 
Lower courts' application of Strickland has produced some appal-
ling results. In Mitchell v. Kemp, 42 for example, the defendant pled 
guilty to murder. At the penalty trial, the prosecution established as 
aggravating factors that the murder occurred during the commission 
of an armed robbery and aggravated assault. The defense presented no 
mitigating evidence. Predictably, the defendant was sentenced to 
death. The defense could have presented powerful mitigating evidence 
relating to the defendant's background, including his upbringing in an 
impoverished family, the role he played in trying to care for his sib-
lings, 43 and his outstanding record in high school. 44 Counsel, how-
ever, made "no attempt to interview any potential mitigating 
witnesses."45 In fact, other than speaking to the defendant's father 
over the telephone on two occasions, counsel did not even contact any 
member of the defendant's family. Moreover, he "made no inquiries 
into [defendant's] academic, medical, or psychological history."46 
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). 
41. Strickland's circumstances were unusual. Against the advice of counsel, defendant 
David Washington waived his right to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing, thus 
leaving his sentencing exclusively to the trial judge. As a sentencer, this judge had a reputation 
as one who "thought it important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime," 466 U.S. at 
673, a reputation that was seemingly confirmed when he stated during Washington's plea collo-
quy that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit 
their responsibility." 466 U.S. at 672. Under these circumstances, Washington's counsel had 
some basis for believing the judge would be more lenient if Washington refrained from presenting 
evidence in mitigation of his criminal responsibility. 
42. 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987). 
43. 762 F.2d at 888. 
44. The defendant "had been captain of the football team; leader of the prayer before each 
game; an above-average student; [and a participant in many extracurricular activities, including] 
student council, school choir, glee club, [and] math club .... " 483 U.S. at 1028 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of cert.). 
45. 483 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
46. 483 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
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Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that counsel's decision 
not to investigate was not unreasonable and that, in any event, the 
attorney's failure did not result in prejudice to the defendant.47 
Other interpretations of Strickland have been less restrictive. Per-
haps reflecting the views expressed in guidelines such as those pub-
lished by the American Bar Association in 1989,48 some federal 
courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have displayed an increasing 
awareness of capital defense counsel's obligation to investigate for the 
purpose of presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty stage, 49 along 
with at least an embryonic awareness of counsel's obligation to make 
reasonable strategic decisions relating to that stage. so These cases sug-
gest that the reasonableness prong of the Strickland test may eventu-
ally be interpreted to reflect the professional judgment of 
knowledgeable capital defense attorneys. 
Since 1987, the Court has remained silent on the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in capital cases.s1 In its habeas decisions, how-
ever, the Court has displayed a distinct lack of sympathy for problems 
generated by inadequate representation and for the plight of capital 
defendants generally. In a line of decisions beginning with Wainwright 
v. Sykes, s2 the Court has barred criminal defendants from raising on 
habeas issues that were not properly presented in the state courts be-
cause of defense attorneys' ignorance or negligence.s3 In McCleskey v. 
Zant,s4 decided in 1991, the Court expanded Sykes to impose the same 
restrictions on a capital defendant's ability to raise new claims not 
presented in a prior habeas petition. Furthermore, in a case decided 
this past term, the Court sharply limited the circumstances under 
which a capital defendant can establish an exception to these holdings. 
Sawyer v. Whitley ss held that to establish an exception the capital de-
fendant must show "by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 
47. 762 F.2d at 889. 
48. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guidelines 11.4.1 & 11.8.3 (1989) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES]. 
49. See, e.g., Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding counsel ineffective 
for failure to investigate for mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2282 and cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992); Horton v. Zant, 941F.2d1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 1516 (1992). See generally White, supra note 12. 
50. See Chambers v. Arrnontrout, 907 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to inves-
tigate and present critical defense testimony in a capital case was ineffective assistance of coun-
sel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 369 (1990). See generally White, supra note 12, at 52. 
51. Since Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the Court has not directly considered an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a capital case. 
52. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
53. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 
(1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). See generally Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas 
Corpus After State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 FORDHAM L. RE.v. 
663, 695-703 (1985). 
54. 111 s. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
55. 112 s. Ct. 2514 (1992). 
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constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find [the defendant] 
eligible for the death penalty under [the applicable state] law."56 
Thus, a showing that the constitutional error probably resulted in the 
defendant's death penalty, or even that it almost certainly resulted in 
his death penalty, will not be sufficient. The defendant must demon-
strate that, in the absence of the error, he could not have been sen-
tenced to death. 
These holdings are particularly significant because, as Paternoster 
notes, capital defendants have until recently had a remarkably high 
success rate in federal habeas corpus cases. 57 Under our system of 
justice, federal habeas corpus is the last opportunity for correcting 
constitutional errors in capital cases. By restricting the circumstances 
under which such errors will be considered on the merits, the Court 
reduces a significant safeguard and widens the path toward execution. 
The Court is not alone in seeking to reduce a capital defendant's 
safeguards. Over the past two sessions of Congress, bills setting even 
greater limits on capital defendants' rights to present claims in the 
federal courts have been proposed. 58 These proposals range from im-
posing a deadline on the capital defendant's right to file a habeas peti-
tion59 to sharply curtailing all criminal defendants' access to federal 
habeas corpus. 60 Although these measures have not been enacted, 
their political viability reflects a public mood increasingly favorable to 
capital punishment61 and increasingly frustrated by a system that tol-
erates lengthy delays between imposition and execution of a death 
sentence. 
IV. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT'S FUTURE 
Given the current legal and political climate, Paternoster's predic-
56. 112 S. Ct. at 2523. 
57. P. 208. The reversal rate in capital habeas petitions was "60%-75% as of 1982, 70% as 
of 1983, and 60% as of 1986." Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attor-
ney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 521 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
58. See generally Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied? -A Comment on Recent 
Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665 (1990). 
59. See, e.g., The Thurmond-Specter bill, Amendment 1687 to S. 1970, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 
136 CONG. REc. S6805-07 (daily ed. May 23, 1990). See generally Michael Mello & Donna 
Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the 
Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
451, 452 n.2 (1991) (listing several congressional bills proposing time limitations for habeas 
corpus petitions). 
60. See Neil A. Lewis, 4 Key Issues in Dispute on Package to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
27, 1991 at BS (discussing congressional conference approval of a bill curtailing a death row 
inmate's habeas challenge ifit is determined that the inmate received a full and fair hearing in the 
state courts). 
61. In a recent Texas poll, 92% of respondents favored capital punishment. See James Pin-
kerton, Crime Poll Finds Many Fear Even a Daytime Walk, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 7, 1992, at 
A28. National opinion polls show that about three quarters of all Americans support capital 
punishment. See Know Who You're Pulling For, STAR TRIB., Sept. 6, 1992, at A23. 
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tion that "capital punishment will simply wither away over the years" 
(p. 286) seems unlikely, at least for the near future. While Paternoster 
correctly states that executions have averaged no more than ten per 
year since 1977, this figure is misleading. From 1987 to 1992, execu-
tions have averaged about eighteen per year,62 and, during 1992, 
thirty-one executions were performed. 63 Thus, the pace of executions 
is increasing. 
Moreover, the current political climate seems likely to accelerate 
this trend. During the recent presidential campaign, then-Governor 
Clinton not only proclaimed his support for the death penalty in a 
paid political advertisement64 but highlighted that support by inter-
rupting his campaign to approve two Arkansas executions. 65 The 
Republicans, especially Vice President Quayle, nevertheless criticized 
Clinton on the ground that his statement supporting Governor Mario 
Cuomo, a death penalty opponent, as a potential Supreme Court ap-
pointee indicated that he was not a committed proponent of capital 
punishment. 66 The political climate is also reflected in the proposed 
federal legislation relating to the death penalty. 67 
Nevertheless, Paternoster makes some pertinent arguments in sup-
port of his prediction. His discussion of public attitudes toward capi-
tal punishment is especially interesting. Citing opinion surveys by 
William Bowers, 68 he shows public support for the death penalty is 
greatly diminished when people are confronted with the choice be-
tween the death penalty and the alternative punishment of life without 
the possibility of parole plus restitution. Whereas between seventy and 
eighty percent initially express support for death as a punishment for 
murder, fewer than one third continue to do so when the death penalty 
is compared with this alternative punishment (p. 275). As Paternoster 
states, this result reflects the public's ambivalence toward capital pun-
ishment, suggesting that an alternative punishment that adequately 
protects the public may be preferred. Paternoster uses these data to 
62. From January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1991, 89 defendants were executed. Thus, during 
that five-year span, the number of executions averaged 17.8 per year. See DEATH Row, U.S.A, 
supra note 7, at 5. 
63. See DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 6, at 10. 
64. See Harry Berkowitz, They're on the Ad-tack, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 1992, at 43. 
65. See Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises 
Questions on Governor's Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, at AS (reporting that Clinton inter-
rupted campaign to deny clemency for condemned killer Rickey Ray Rector); Killer Executed 
After Clinton Denies Clemency, Assoc. PRESS, May 8, 1992 (reporting that Clinton interrupted 
campaign to review the case of condemned killer Steven Douglas Hill). 
66. Thomas Wicker, The Democrats as the Devil's Disciples, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, at 
D3. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
68. Pp. 275-76; see William J. Bowers, Massachusetts Voters Want an Alternative to the 
Death Penalty (unpublished report from Department of Criminal Justice, Northeastern Univer-
sity, Boston, Massachusetts). 
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contend that educating the public about the possibility of alternative 
punishments may hasten capital punishment's abolition (p. 281). 
In addition, Paternoster seeks to place the capital punishment de-
bate in a broader context. Using data from Amnesty International, he 
points out that our continued use of capital punishment places the 
United States in some rather unenviable company. Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
South Africa, and other states with repressive regimes continue to em-
ploy the death penalty. In contrast, the great majority of Western de-
mocracies do not (p. 285). Drawing upon Capital Punishment and the 
American Agenda, an insightful book by Franklin Zimring and 
Gordon Hawkins, 69 Paternoster asserts that the experience of other 
Western democracies suggests that the present political climate does 
not preclude the possibility of capital punishment's abolition in the 
near future (p. 285-87). 
These thought-provoking observations provide a basis for ques-
tioning the long-term viability of capital punishment in this country. 
Nevertheless, one would be naive to suppose that either the results of 
public attitude surveys or the experience of other Western democracies 
will affect the pace of American executions in the near future. Prefer-
ences expressed to a social scientist will not readily translate into a 
meaningful shift in public opinion. Moreover, prognosticating aboli-
tion on the basis of the experience of Western European democracies 
seems dubious in view of the significant cultural and demographic dif-
ferences between the United States and the countries of Western Eu-
rope. 70 Given the present legal and political climate in this country, 
the pace of executions will continue to accelerate over the next five 
years. Over the past several years, defendants have been sentenced to 
death at the rate of at least 160 per year.71 If, as seems likely, at least 
one third of those sentenced to death are eventually executed, the pace 
of executions by the mid-1990s will be at least fifty per year- exceed-
ing the pace in the 1950s. 
Long-term predictions are more difficult. When we moved to the 
brink of abolition during the Warren Court era, two problems with 
our system of capital punishment seemed especially significant: first, 
the death penalty had a deleterious effect on our system of justice; 72 
69. FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMER!• 
CAN AGENDA (1987). 
70. Some of the most obvious differences include homicide rates, population density, extent 
of racial tensions, and national decisionmaking processes. See Welsh S. White, Patterns in Capi· 
ta/ Punishment, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2165, 2167 (1987) (book review). 
71. Over the past six years, the population of death row has climbed from 1838 to 2676 
despite the fact that approximately 180 defendants have been executed. Compare DEATH Row, 
U.S.A., supra note 6, at 1 with DEATH Row, U.S.A., Spring 1986, at 1 (bulletin published by 
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc.). 
72. In 1959, when the American Law Institute was considering whether to recommend aboli· 
tion, Justice Robert H. Jackson was prepared to argue that capital punishment "unnecessarily 
multiplie[s] trials and appeals [and] that the entire judicial process was sentimentalized and sen· 
May 1993] Capital Punishment 1441 
second, the death penalty was unfairly applied. Through its examina-
tion of empirical studies and other data, Capital Punishment in 
America demonstrates that both of these problems not only continue 
to exist but are in fact more serious than they were under the pre-
Furman system of capital punishment. Although not emphasized by 
Paternoster, the role of capital defense counsel is particularly signifi-
cant. If, as some courts are beginning to recognize, 73 effective assist-
ance of counsel in a capital case generally requires extensive 
investigation of every aspect of the defendant's history, examination of 
the defendant by expert witnesses, and extensive introduction of miti-
gating evidence at a penalty trial, we will have to choose between the 
substantial expenditure of resources necessary to provide every capital 
defendant with effective assistance of counsel and a system in which 
our failure to provide every capital defendant with this most basic pro-
cedural safeguard exacerbates the death penalty's arbitrary applica-
tion. When the political climate changes so as to permit a more 
objective examination of capital punishment, recognition of these in-
tractable problems may again lead us toward abolition. 
sationalized by injection of life-and-death questions." MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNU-
SUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 22 (1973). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
